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SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP  
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP  
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP  
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR  
NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2035  
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):  
(U) PRINCIPALS MEETING, JANUARY 14, 2010

Classified By: Political M/C Susan M. Elliott. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and (h).

11. (U) This is SFO-MOS-005.

12. (U) Meeting Date: January 14, 2010  
Times: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.; 4:00 - 5:00  
P.M.  
Place: MFA, Moscow

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SUMMARY  
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13. (S) MFA DVBR Director Antonov told A/S Gottemoeller that he believed START Follow-On negotiations would be completed in four weeks or fewer. He said that said that the Russian team would return to Geneva to work no earlier than February 1, and added that the GOR might not schedule the next round of talks if the U.S. did not compromise more. A/S Gottemoeller said that the U.S. side would be in Geneva on January 25 and urged Antonov to send at least technical experts to continue conforming of the treaty and protocol texts. Antonov agreed to treat Medvedev's December 12 statement on telemetry not as a "sacred text," but a text that perhaps could be modified. He added that answers to U.S. questions regarding telemetry would be passed to CJCS on January 22. He posited that the GOR was willing to discuss setting the limit of deployed and non-deployed SLBM and ICBM launchers at 800, but asked about bombers also. He confirmed that the draft of agreed statement 6 on elimination exhibitions/demonstrations is a basis for discussion. Antonov blamed the harsh tone of a recent nonpaper passed to A/S Gottemoeller on the Russian Embassy in Washington, but confirmed that the issues raised therein were valid. He said he could not officially reply to U/S Tauscher's December 12 nonpaper on missile defense cooperation, but said the U.S. and Russia had to cooperate on this issue. Various START

Follow-On treaty articles were discussed, and A/S Gottemoeller passed to Antonov a redraft of Article (VIII) (VII) and a nonpaper on rapid reload.

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Four More Weeks Needed to Complete Negotiations  
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14. (S) MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov told A/S Gottemoeller that his "personal view" was that START Follow-On (SFO) negotiations could be finished in four weeks "or fewer" if the January 22 meetings between NSA Jones and Russian Presidential Advisor Prikhodko, as well as CJCS Mullen and CHOD Makarov, went well. He added that both the U.S. and Russian sides would need to come prepared for the next round of talks.

15. (S) When A/S Gottemoeller suggested the next round of talks begin in Geneva on January 25, Antonov said the Russian team would return to Geneva on February 1 "or maybe later if we need more time to work on guidance, or maybe we will not schedule the beginning of the new round yet of the U.S. is not willing to take steps in our direction." A/S Gottemoeller replied that this was a bad idea and would not advance efforts to conclude the negotiations. She reiterated that the U.S. team would be in Geneva by January 25 and suggested that the GOR send at least technical experts to continue work on conforming of the treaty and protocol texts. Antonov said he would consider this.

16. (S) Antonov said the Russian team would be ready to work in Moscow on conforming the SFO document with the U.S. side

from January 18 to January 21. He noted that he was happy that the Russian delegation remained together as a coherent unit during the holidays. The negotiators from various GOR entities had been working on the issues that remained in the negotiations back at their own agencies, he said. He added that everyone attended the MFA DVBR office holiday party. (Note: For those working in MFA DVBR attendance was required. End Note.)

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Hopeful Signals On Telemetry  
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17. (S) A/S Gottemoeller told Antonov that the USG was using Medvedev's December 12 proposal as the basis of its work, but wanted to suggest some slight changes in it, consistent with the discussion of the Presidents in Copenhagen. Implying that Medvedev's proposal was not a "sacred text," Antonov replied that adjustments to the text could be discussed. For example, the review process for the telemetry exchange program could be modified. Antonov argued that the U.S. did not seem to understand that the GOR proposal for a review of the telemetry exchange program, perhaps after two or three years, did not necessarily need to result in an adjustment or abandonment of the program. "Perhaps no changes will need to be made," he said.

18. (S) Antonov said that the MOD had prepared answers to the questions on telemetry that the U.S. passed to MFA DVBR Deputy Director Sergey Koshelev on December 23. These responses, however, were being "fine tuned" and CHOD Makarov would likely pass them to CJCS Mullen when they meet on January 22. Further discussion of the telemetry questions would have to wait until then, he said. He also noted that the U.S. side might have additional questions on telemetry, which the Russian side would be willing to answer.

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Limits on Launchers  
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19. (S) In answer to a question from Gottemoeller, Antonov said the GOR was ready to discuss the limit on deployed and non deployed SLBM and ICBM launchers of 800. He asked, "What about bombers?" When A/S Gottemoeller recalled the Russian

proposal to include non-deployed bombers as part of a possible launcher limit, Antonov replied, "I understand that there is no such thing as non-deployed bombers in this treaty." A/S Gottemoeller replied that she would check on that.

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Elimination Exhibitions/Demonstrations  
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¶10. (S) Antonov acknowledged that a discussion of the issues put forth in agreed statement six was still possible. When A/S Gottemoeller suggested a possible trade-off involving bomber inspections/demonstration and exhibitions/demonstrations of eliminated items, Antonov reacted positively, adding that this was an important issue for the GOR.

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GOR Nonpaper Discussed  
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¶11. (S) Antonov said that a GOR nonpaper sent via the Russian Embassy in Washington to A/S Gottemoeller which called into question the USG's commitment to reach a "balanced and

equitable agreement" on a START follow-on treaty, had been the initiative of the Russian Embassy. "We did not give them permission" to draft the nonpaper, Antonov said. "They were supposed to just deliver the talking points." A/S Gottemoeller said the tone of the nonpaper left a bad impression among policy makers in Washington. Antonov replied, "maybe there is a problem with the tone," but the nonpaper reflected the GOR position. He added that, in his view, the treaty text was ready except for the telemetry issue.

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U/S Tauscher's MD Cooperation Proposal  
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¶12. (S) In answer to a question from Gottemoeller, Antonov said that he could not officially comment on U/S Tauscher's December 5 proposal on missile defense (MD) cooperation, but his personal view was that the U.S. and GOR would have to compromise on MD eventually. If the U.S. and Russia had agreed to a compromise on MD, then it would be easier to agree on a START follow-on treaty, he said.

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Various Treaty Articles Discussed  
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¶13. (S) A/S Gottemoeller presented some changes that had emerged from the U.S. review of the Treaty text in Washington. In most cases, Antonov either accepted the change, or took it for further review. Sometimes, he complained that the U.S. side was not moving fast enough.

Article III  
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¶14. (S) A/S Gottemoeller proposed that Article III.2(b) should be reworded to read "For each deployed heavy bomber, the number of nuclear warheads shall be (three)1(one)2." She explained that this change would dispense with an undefined term, "nuclear armaments", in favor of a defined term, "nuclear warheads", and was closer to the original Russian position. Antonov accepted the change without comment.

Article IV  
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¶15. (S) Antonov had no further comment on U.S. proposals to limit deployed and non-deployed SLBM and ICBM launchers to 800 in Article IV.3, but he complained that the U.S. side had not reciprocated when he removed brackets from the paragraphs touching on test heavy bombers. This perceived lack of

reciprocation was a sore point.

#### Article V

¶16. (S) Antonov also complained that the U.S. side had not removed brackets on Article V.4, but Gottemoeller reminded him that this paragraph, which has to do with modification or conversion of missile defense interceptors, is tied up in the discussions on telemetry that are still ongoing. Once the telemetry issue is decided, the brackets will be decided.

#### Article VI

¶17. (S) Antonov said the GOR would never change its position that this article on mobile missile verification must be out of the treaty; only Medvedev could change the GOR position. He also said that the U.S. could not assume that substance

could simply be moved to the protocols; the Russian side would not agree to unique treatment for mobile ICBMs. If the U.S. side wanted to know the exact location of Russian mobile missile launchers, then the GOR wanted to know the exact location of U.S. nuclear submarines and not just their general location. A/S Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that it is easier to count and keep track of submarines than it is of mobile missiles.

#### Article VIII

¶18. (S) A/S Gottemoeller handed over a redraft of Article VIII, and delivered the accompanying talking points:

Paper of the U.S. side  
January 13, 2010

Redraft of Article (VIII)1 (VII)2

¶1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in Part Two of its Protocol.

¶2. Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in such data and shall provide other notifications provided for in the Protocol to this Treaty, in order to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty.

¶3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to provide and receive notifications unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty.

¶4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under this Treaty.

(5. Each Party shall have the right to release to the public or a third party the information that it has received in the initial exchange of data described in paragraph 2, Section I, Part 2 of the Protocol, which shall be listed in Part Two of the Protocol and associated Annexes, as well as any photographs appended thereto, except as otherwise provided in this Article. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on releasing to the public other data and information provided or received in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this Treaty. Such release will only be conducted subject to the consent of the other Party.)1

(6.)1 (5)2 Geographic coordinates (relating to data contained in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty)2, (unique identifiers,)1 site diagrams (provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty)2, and coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty shall not be released to the public, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative

Commission.

(7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles, as well as the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear armaments for deployed heavy bombers, as stated in subparagraph (1)(a) and (1)(b) of Article II, may be released to the public. All other nuclear warhead and strategic delivery vehicle data shall not be released to the public or any third party unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.)<sup>1</sup>

Talking Points:

Populating the Database:

--The U.S. approach is to populate the data base 45 days after signature using data derived from the July 2009 START data, which is public information.

--45 days after signature, the Parties will exchange data derived from the July 2009 START data.

--This obligation will need to be provisionally applied in order to have a binding legal effect.

--The timing and exchange of other data after Entry into Force will be governed by the specific terms of the Protocol that provide for such exchange.

--This structure means that we will not have data for all SFO categories (e.g., warhead numbers) when the Treaty is signed or when the Treaty is sent to the Senate for ratification.

--To assist the sides in preparing for the exchange of data 45 days after signature, the U.S. delegation in Geneva will be prepared to provide an example of how the U.S. would populate the database with data derived from the July 2009 START data. It would be useful if Russia would reciprocate.

Release of Data:

--Our new, compromise language sets out a three-tiered approach.

--First. Data that is derived from the July 2009 data that we will exchange 45 days after signature may be released to the public, with some limited exceptions that will be reflected in paragraph 6/5. The information to be released is already public, which should address any concerns about release in the SFO context. Any information exchanged in a classified annex, such as site diagrams and geographic coordinates, would not be releasable to the public.

--Second. The Parties may release aggregate SDV and warhead numbers. All other warhead and SDV information shall not be released unless the Parties otherwise agree. Under this approach, the aggregate SDV and warhead data would be the only categories of SFO-specific data to be released to the public without a requirement to reach agreement in the BCC.

--Third. All other SFO information may only be released subject to the consent of the other Party. This data includes the majority of information received in the course of SFO implementation. This should address Russian concerns about certain categories of sensitive data.

¶19. (S) Antonov made no comment, saying he was not prepared to do such detailed substantive work, but would immediately send the paper for translation.

Article XII

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¶20. (S) Antonov commented that the Russian side had not agreed to the inspection activities the U.S. side had proposed to confirm elimination of strategic offensive arms, as described in Article XII.3. The Russian military would

need more time to consider this, he said.

#### Article XIV

¶21. (S) Antonov said that Article XIV, subparagraph (c) belonged in the protocol rather than the treaty, as notifications are a technical matter. A/S Gottemoeller said that the U.S. side would provide a detailed response on both Article V and Article XIV, which are related to each other, in Geneva.

#### ----- Nonpaper "Fifth Agreed Statement" On Rapid Reload Passed -----

¶22. (S/REL Russia) A/S Gottemoeller delivered the following nonpaper to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov, which he accepted without comment and sent for translation:

Paper of the U.S. Side  
January 13, 2010

#### Fifth Agreed Statement

The Parties agree that, in order to provide assurances that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, each Party undertakes not to conduct rapid reload and neither Party shall produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload. For the purposes of this Agreed Statement, the term "rapid reload" means reloading a silo launcher of ICBMs in less than 12 hours or a mobile launcher of ICBMs in less than four hours after a missile has been launched or removed from such a launcher. In the event of emergence in the future of a system that one Party considers could be a rapid reload capability, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a system for consideration by the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

¶23. (U) A/S Gottemoeller cleared this cable.  
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